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THE INTERPRETATION IN MEXICO OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS
ALEJANDRO OSUNA-GONZÁLEZ*
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG)1 came into effect in Mexico on January 1,
1989.2 The purpose of this Article is to assess the manner in which the
CISG has been applied by the Mexican courts. Unfortunately, and despite
that it has been more than twenty-four years during which international
sales involving parties in Mexico have likely been governed by the CISG,
very few cases applying the CISG have come to light.
Finding Mexican CISG cases is complicated. The Mexican judicial system poses the biggest obstacle, since state and federal decisions are generally not reported. Nevertheless, I have been able to obtain twenty-six
decisions (at the trial and appellate levels) derived from some nine court
cases,3 but I am certain that there are more CISG cases out there.
* Alejandro Osuna-González practices law in Tijuana, Baja California,
Mexico. He obtained his J.D. degree from the Law School of the Universidad
Iberoamericana in Tijuana in 1995. He obtained an LL.M. from the University of
Pittsburgh’s School of Law in 1998. Mr. Osuna teaches at Universidad
Iberoamericana Tijuana, where he lectures on International Sales Law, Foreign
Investments, and Commercial Arbitration. For comments on this presentation he
can be contacted at alejandro@osunalegal.com.
1. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
2. See Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] [Official Diary of the Federation],
Mar. 17, 1988 (Mex.).
3. The cases are: Peterman Lumber, Inc. v. Encinos Rossy, S.A. de C.V., Juzgado Sexto de Primera Instancia del Partido de Estado de Baja California [Sixth
Civil Court of First Instance of the State of Baja California], July 2001; Banks Hardwoods v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez Garcı́a, Segunda Sala del Tribunal Superior de
Justicia de Baja California [Second Court of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, Baja
California], Mar. 24, 2006; Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de
C.V., Baja California, Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado del Decimoquinto Circuito [Baja
California, Fourth Panel of the Fifteenth Circuit Court], Aug. 2007; Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Idesa Petroquı́mica S.A. de C.V., Primer Tribunal
Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito [First Civil Court of the First Circuit], Mar. 2005; Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V., Quinto
Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito [Fifth Civil Court of the
First Circuit], May 2005; Barcel, S.A. v. Steve Kliff [Second Panel of the Superior
Court of Justice], Mar. 2007; Wolf Metals, Inc. v. Fetasa de Mexicalia, S.A. Also,
there are two cases where the CISG clearly applied, but the judges ignored its
application: Texas CCC, Inc., v. A&J Cheese Co. de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.,
decided by the Fifth Civil Court in Tijuana, Baja California; and Gerhard Deutsch
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Most of the state court decisions were provided to me by acquaintances that are actively involved in litigating collection cases and know of
my interest in CISG decisions. A couple of them, I argued myself.
The federal CISG decisions were obtained through contacts in the
federal judiciary who assisted me in locating cases in the judiciary’s intranet, which is not open to the public. There are three references to the
CISG in the Supreme Court-administered JUS case law database, but two
of them are derived from administrative cases applying customs legislation, while the other case is in reference to a cosigner of a debt, who secured a CISG governed transaction with real property.
The scope of this Article is rather limited. Instead of discussing each
and every one of the Mexican CISG decisions—most of which I have already discussed elsewhere4—I have limited my discussion to four cases
that address the issues of contract formation, the standard of proof to
show a contract exists, contract performance, and damages: Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Grupo Idesa; Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v.
Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V.; Banks Hardwoods Inc. v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez; and Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V.
II. A SAMPLING
A.
1.

OF

MEXICAN CISG CASES

Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Grupo Idesa, S.A. de C.V.5
Background

This case involves an American purchaser-plaintiff and a Mexican
seller. A purchase representative at Kolmar, after ending a phone conversation with seller’s agent, sent seller an email confirming their discussions,
which included: that the contract was for 3,000 metric tons of MEG at
$392.50 FOB/seller’s terminal at Coatzacoalcos; payment as of thirty days
from the date on the bill of lading; and goods to be delivered in January
2003. Seller then emailed confirming the purchase order, but stating that
it needed to get confirmation that their loading terminal would be available in 2003. Seller further added that it would contact buyer by the following Monday.
Three days later (December 2, 2002), buyer sent another email requesting clarification of seller’s comments regarding the availability of the
terminal. On December 19, buyer sent another email designating the ship
Produktions und Vertriebsges, M.B.H v. Artiken, S.A. de C.V., from Leon, Guanajuato, Mexico.
4. See Alejandro Osuna-González, La Interpretación Judicial en México Relativa a
la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de
Mercaderı́as, CONTRATACIÓN Y ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONALES 91–129 (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2005).
5. See Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Idesa Petroquı́mica S.A. de
C.V., Quincuagésimo Juzgado Civil de Primera Instancia del Distrito Federal
[Fiftieth Civil Court of First Instance in the Federal District], Oct. 2004. I thank
attorney Miguel Bernal for providing me with a copy of the decisions rendered in
this case, without whose help this Article would not have been possible.
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that would pick up the 3,000 tons of MEG, and requesting that seller confirm its nomination of the ship that afternoon. More than twenty days
after buyer’s last communication (January 10, 2003), Idesa’s agent sent an
email claiming that the situation had gotten complicated, that he was fighting to save the transaction, but that the 3,000 tons of MEG had already
been reserved. Seller further indicated that it was under a lot of pressure
so that its company did not lose money, and made a new offer to deliver to
buyer at the same terminal but at a price of $400 per ton, or at $415 per
ton delivered at an alternate terminal in the port of Altamira. Agent for
Idesa acknowledged in his email that he was not honoring their original
agreement. Agent for Kolmar refused to renegotiate the terms of what he
believed was a closed deal, and considered the seller’s conduct a breach of
their agreement made in late November. Kolmar filed a lawsuit in Mexico
City for damages suffered as a consequence of seller’s refusal to deliver the
goods at the agreed upon price. Idesa defended on the grounds that no
contract had been formed because, according to their internal procedures, it was not in their own standard form. Idesa also defended by stating that their January 10th proposal had not been accepted by the buyer.
In his ruling, the first-instance judge qualified Kolmar’s November
2002 email as a proposal to Idesa to enter into a contract, and that Idesa’s
email of January 10, 2003 was a counteroffer per CISG Article 19.6 The
judge also reasoned that Idesa never issued a final confirmation of all of
the conditions established in Kolmar’s “offer,” because Kolmar’s proposal
not only concerned the price, goods, and quality, but it also referred to
the time and manner of delivery, and that not all of these terms had been
unconditionally accepted by seller. The judge further argued that seller
never consented to delivering the goods at its terminal in Coatzacoalcos,
nor did it agree that this delivery would take place in January 2003. In my
opinion, the court’s first mistake was qualifying Kolmar’s agent’s confirmatory email as an offer when it was merely putting in writing what was likely
a verbal agreement that had been made over the phone.7 The court’s
6. CISG, supra note 1, art. 19 reads:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains
additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer
and constitutes a counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but
contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the
terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without
undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to
that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the
terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the
price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.
Id.
7. Professor Marı́a del Pilar Perales Viscasillas arrived at this same conclusion
on this case. See Marı́a del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Modification and Termination of
the Contract (Art. 29 CISG), 25 J.L. & COM. 167, 173 n.30 (2005). This source also
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decision should have included an analysis of CISG Article 8 (regarding
interpretation of a party’s intent),8 and CISG Article 14 (on what constitutes an offer)9 to see if buyer’s email actually qualified as a proposal to
make a contract, or if from reading its contents an alternate interpretation
was possible. This did not take place.
It was only logical that after this initial snafu by the court, any other
communication by Kolmar’s agent would very likely be qualified as a
counteroffer per CISG Article 19. But even this view is questionable. After
rereading seller’s email of January 10, 2003, agent for Idesa was in fact
admitting to Kolmar that it would not be honoring the agreement it had
originally made by phone, and recognized that this would surely cause
problems. Idesa was now attempting to extract a higher price from
Kolmar. Unfortunately, the court did a terrible job of using CISG Article 8
to interpret the statements made by both buyer and seller. In my opinion,
the parties agreed on all of the basic terms (goods, quantity, and quality),
and only left pending the issue of confirming the availability of seller’s
terminal. Also, the fact that seller remained silent after buyer emailed
seller twice—once to request clarification on issue of the terminal, and
later to designate the ship that would pick up the goods—could have been
interpreted to mean that seller was in agreement with buyer10—at least
this is the only reasonable understanding that I can extract per CISG Article 8(2). If the contrary were true, Idesa would have immediately conappears on UNCITRAL’s website at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CISG
25/Viscasillas.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
8. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any
subsequent conduct of the parties.
Id.
9. CISG, supra note 1, art. 14 reads:
(1) A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates
the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.
(2) A proposal other than one addressed to one or more specific persons
is to be considered merely as an invitation to make offers, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the person making the proposal.
Id.
10. I am not particularly troubled with CISG Article 18(1) regarding the silence issue, because in this case, buyer was not making a proposal, but was requesting clarification and advising seller of the ship that would pick up the goods.
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tacted Kolmar to clarify that no contract had yet been concluded after
Kolmar’s emails. Instead, Idesa’s agent would not email until the second
week of January 2003, and only to advise Kolmar that it wanted to increase
the price and possibly change the place of delivery, aware that this would
potentially cause problems. My opinion is further supported by the fact
that Idesa never mentioned that there was an issue regarding the availability of the terminal; it was all about the price.
With regards to the interpretative mandates under CISG’s Article 7
(internationality, uniformity, and good faith) the judge used the civilian
expression aceptación lisa y llana (roughly full and unconditional acceptance),
a phrase that has a clear local law connotation, although the decision does
acknowledge that in matters governed by the CISG, there is no room for
the Federal Civil Code to apply. With regard to the need to promote uniformity, the judge did not cite any case law interpreting the CISG, nor
does it seem that buyer made any attempt to do so in an attempt to persuade the judge.11 It is also evident that no effort was made by the court
to interpret the CISG in a manner that promotes the observance of good
faith, although it is likely that the court assumed it was by not allowing
Kolmar to go after Idesa, with whom (the court believed) it never concluded a contract.
2.

Kolmar Appeals the Decision

Kolmar appealed to Mexico City’s Superior Court,12 claiming that the
trial court had erred when analyzing the evidence and applying the CISG
to the facts. According to buyer, the court should have found, by a proper
interpretation of CISG Articles 7 and 8, that the parties had in fact made a
verbal agreement, and that seller failed to object to the emails sent after
they negotiated the contract. Kolmar also claimed that the court misconstrued seller’s lack of response to Idesa’s email, designating the ship as a
non-acceptance, and that in doing so, the trial court had also violated Article 9 of the CISG.13 Kolmar further added that CISG Article 19(3) was not
applicable.
11. See Zivilgericht Kanton Basel-Stadt [ZG] [Civil Court] Dec. 21, 1992,
docket no. P4 1991/238 (Switz.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=
104; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main [OLG] [higher regional court] July 5,
1995 (Ger.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=169.
12. See Kolmar Petrochemicals America, Inc. v. Grupo Idesa, S.A. de C.V., Sala
Civil del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal [Superior Civil Court of
Justice of the Federal District], Jan. 2005.
13. This issue arose because Kolmar claimed that the court had misinterpreted Kolmar’s email advising it of the name of the ship that would pick up the
goods in Altamira, and that in fact, in spite of the email’s wording, it was not
necessary for Idesa to approve of the ship. This constituted a violation of CISG
Article 9, which incorporates commercial usages and practices either followed by
the parties or that is widely observed in international trade.
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In its decision, the Superior Court affirmed the ruling and reasoned
that the trial court had given proper weight to the emails submitted by
buyer-plaintiff, and that is was “evident” that:
The parties had not agreed on the price, payment, quality and
quantity and place and time of delivery, thus triggering the proviso contained in paragraph 3 of article 19 of the United Nations’
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, nineteen eighty); therefore, it is incorrect to even talk
about the existence of a contract.
Unfortunately, the Superior Court read CISG Article 19(3) as a checklist of items which the parties must fully satisfy for a contract to be concluded, an interpretation that is clearly wrong. The Appellate Court further reasoned that, because seller never responded to buyer’s request for
clarification on the issue of seller’s terminal, nor to acceptance of the ship
designated by buyer to pick up the goods, that this was a clear indication
that buyer’s offer had not been accepted. The Superior Court further argued that the parties had not agreed on the price and place of delivery,
and in doing so, the Superior Court went back to Idesa’s email in which it
was attempting to renegotiate the price. Just like the trial court, the Superior Court failed to analyze this issue properly. As noted in my discussion
of the trial court’s decision, the parties had already agreed to the goods,
the price, and date and place of delivery; the only thing that was pending
was the availability of seller’s terminal.
Echoing the view of the trial court, the Superior Court denied that
the good faith principle provided for under Article 7 of the CISG had
been violated in any way because the parties had never arrived at a consensus with regard to the price of the goods, nor regarding the place and time
of delivery, making it improper for buyer to attempt to enforce a contract
that was never legally concluded. In its view, the Superior Court probably
thought it was in fact enforcing the mandate for the promotion of good
faith.
The Superior Court dismissed the claim that the trial court had made
a wrongful interpretation of CISG Article 8, instead reasoning that the
court had disposed of this issue correctly, and that the exchange of emails
showed that the parties were merely negotiating. In my opinion, the Superior Court should have analyzed CISG Article 8 in tandem with Articles 14
and 19, not in an isolated manner as it did.
The Superior Court did not include any citations to case law or treatises, nor does it appear that Kolmar’s counsel attempted to sway the court
by doing so. I believe a different result could have been achieved had this
occurred.
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The Decision at the Circuit Court Level14

Finally, buyer appealed before the Circuit Court (amparo proceeding), claiming that the trial and appellate courts had infringed Kolmar’s
fundamental rights due to the lower courts’ erroneous interpretation of
Article 1853 of the Federal Civil Code and Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the CISG.
Unfortunately for buyer, the First Panel of the First Circuit found that
neither the trial nor the appellate courts had committed any violations
when interpreting CISG Articles 7, 8, and 9, because seller never made an
unconditional acceptance (aceptación lisa y llana) of buyer’s proposal to
conclude a contract, and that therefore no violation of buyer’s fundamental rights had taken place.
B.
1.

Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V.15

Background

In this case, Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc., (GPR), an American sellerplaintiff, filed a complaint in Tijuana against Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V.
(Bajaplay), a Mexican buyer demanding U.S. $139,696.98 for various shipments of resins. According to the facts as recited in the decision, the commercial relationship began in 1997 when a corporate officer of buyer
completed a sale on a credit application that was transmitted by fax to
seller. This application for sale on credit contained a few standard clauses
with some general terms. During a period spanning a few years, buyer
would fax purchase orders to acquire the resins it would use in its industrial process. The goods would later be shipped from the United States to
the Mexican buyer by way of a carrier unrelated to the parties.
In their response, Bajaplay denied having completed the credit application, and also denied faxing any purchase orders to GPR. Buyer also
refused to acknowledge it had received the resins seller had sold and delivered, even though evidence such as original invoices and shipping documents issued by the trucking company had been submitted and indicated
Bajaplay was the buyer and consignee.
In his decision, the judge agreed with Bajaplay’s argument. According to the court, GPR did not meet its burden of proving that it had delivered the goods to Bajaplay nor that Bajaplay had actually received them.
The fax printouts, invoices, and shipping documents provided by seller
were given no weight, which denied seller the right to receive the payment
it was due. Clearly, the judge made a bad decision by setting the evidentiary threshold wrongfully high. In issuing his decision, the judge did not
look at the CISG as the law applicable to the merits (nor did he mention
14. Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Idesa Petroquı́mica, S.A. de C.V.,
Primer Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito [First Civil Court
of the First Circuit], Mar. 2005.
15. Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V., Juzgado
Primero Civil del Partido Judicial de Tijuana [Sixth Civil Court of Tijuana], Mar.
2006.
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any other law for that matter). A proper methodology applying the CISG
would have yielded a different result, and would have ultimately saved
GPR a lot of time. The CISG’s Article 11 provides that a contract’s conclusion or evidence of its existence need not be reduced to a writing. In fact,
its existence may be proved by witnesses, a minimum threshold that is
clearly surpassed when a party is able to provide invoices, faxed purchase
orders, and evidence that the goods were placed in the hands of a carrier
for shipment to buyer.16 Also, commentary to the draft of CISG Article 11
clearly noted that this provision had been included because contracts for
the international sale of goods are often concluded by means of communication that do not always involve a written contract.17 The purpose was to
facilitate the showing that a contract exists.
Even from a procedural perspective, the judge contradicted the evidence, weighing rules that were already part of the Commerce Code at the
time the judgment was issued,18 which were heavily influenced by UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce.19
Another aspect that was evident was the judge’s inability to distinguish
between seller’s obligation to deliver the goods and the arrival of the
goods at buyer’s premises. Under both the CISG20 and the Commerce
Code (enacted in 1889),21 goods can be deemed as delivered when the
seller places them at a buyer’s disposal, or in the hands of a carrier. Had
the judge looked at the CISG, he could have easily avoided committing
this horrendous mistake.
2.

The Judgment on Appeal

If the ruling by the trial level court was deficient, the decision rendered by the Second Chamber of the Superior Court of Baja California
was worse.22 GPR argued that the trial level judge had failed to give due
regard to evidence such as the invoices, transport documents, and the
16. See Jose Luis Morales y/o Son Export, S.A. de C.V., de Hermosillo Sonora,
México v. Nez Marketing de Los Angeles, California, Mexican Commission for the
Protection of Foreign Trade (COMPROMEX), May 1993.
17. See JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 410 (1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
18. See Código de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code], arts. 1205, 1298-A
(Mex.); Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] [Official Diary of the Federation], 27
de Agosto de 2009. The judge also did not consider that buyer failed to make a
proper objection to the documents submitted as evidence.
19. See UNCITRAL Secretariat, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce
with Guide to Enactment 1996, with Additional Article 5 bis as Adopted in 1998 (1999),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_
Ebook.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013).
20. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 31.
21. The Mexican Commerce Code was heavily influenced by the Spanish
Commerce Code.
22. See Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V., Segunda
Sala del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Baja California [Second Panel of the
Superior Court, Baja California], Jan. 2007.
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purchase orders that buyer had sent by fax. GPR also argued that the trial
level judge had erred by failing to apply the CISG.
In its decision, the Second Chamber considered that the invoices had
been unilaterally prepared by the GPR; thus, they lacked any evidentiary
value. With regard to the transport documents, the Second Chamber reasoned that because these did not have a signature or a stamp indicating
receipt by Bajaplay, the Second Chamber could not consider that the
goods had been received; therefore, the existence of the contract had not
been proven.23 Evidently, the Second Chamber committed the same mistake, by refusing to recognize the existence of the contract, and by confusing the delivery of the goods with buyer actually taking possession of them.
The biggest blunder was the Second Chamber’s wrong-headed conclusion that, because Article 1 of the CISG provides that it applies to contracts for the international sale of goods, and because seller had not shown
that a contract even existed, it was senseless to look into this body of law.
This is equivalent to refusing to analyze the U.C.C. to determine whether a
contract has been formed under its rules, when a reading of the statute
would be necessary in order to make such a determination.
In another part of its opinion, the Second Chamber stated that “from
the record it is evident that none of the parties cited the CISG as being
applicable.” In my opinion, this represents an abdication of the court’s
obligation to know the law—a duty that stems not just from a rule of procedure,24 but is a fundamental right specifically recognized under the
Constitution, that every person appearing before a Mexican court is entitled to receive a decision that is “reasoned in accordance with the letter of the
Law, its legal interpretation, or the general principles of law.”25
3.

The Decision at the Circuit Court Level (Amparo)26

Seller then appeared before the Federal Circuit Court claiming that
the decision rendered by the Baja California appellate court was in violation of its fundamental right to receive a judgment in accordance with the
law because the trial and appellate courts had failed to apply the CISG to
the merits of the dispute. The Circuit Court agreed with seller, and ordered the appellate court to issue a new judgment based on the CISG,
after reiterating that a judge is under an obligation to apply the law based
23. See Handelsgericht des Kantons St. Gallen [HG] [Commercial Court]
Dec. 5, 1995 docket no. HG 45/1994 (Switz.), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/550/47/PDF/V0055047.pdf?OpenElement.
24. See Código de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code], art. 1324.
25. See Constitución Polı̀tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917, art. 14, ¶ 4 (“In civil cases,
the final decision shall be issued pursuant to the letter of law or its legal interpretation, and lacking such law, it shall be rendered based on general principles of
law.”).
26. Quejoso [Complaint], Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. Amparo Directo 225/
2007, Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado del Decimoquinto Circuito [Fourth Court of the
Fifteenth Circuit].
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on the legal principle of “da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius” (“give me the facts, I
shall give you the law”) and “iura novit curia” (“the judge knows the law”).
According to the Circuit Court, the parties were not required to request
that the court of first instance or the Second Chamber apply the CISG,
because it was not a foreign body of law, but rather a national law because
of its status as a treaty ratified by the Mexican Senate.27
However, the Circuit Court was not exempt from committing its own
mistakes. It reasoned that when a contract is concluded abroad, but will
have effects in Mexico, a court must first look into the validity of the transaction prior to analyzing the application of the CISG. Clearly, the Circuit
Court confused the facts because the contract was not made abroad. Additionally, the invalidity of the contract was never raised as a defense by
buyer, but rather that the contract had never even existed, which are two
very distinct issues. The case would not end here. The Second Chamber
later issued a new decision claiming to apply the CISG, but once again
found for buyer on the same evidentiary grounds, refusing to acknowledge
the validity of faxed documents.
Seller would once again appeal to the Federal Circuit claiming that
the Second Chamber Court was refusing to apply the law and acknowledge
the existence of the contract based on the evidence that GPR had submitted. Seller also argued that the CISG did not require that GPR show that
the goods actually arrived in Tijuana, and that it would suffice to show that
they were delivered to a carrier to deem that GPR had performed its obligations. The Circuit Court agreed with GPR. It would reason that seller
had in fact submitted original invoices that were never properly objected
to by buyer; that seller performed its obligation to deliver the goods per
CISG Article 31 by placing them with a carrier, and that the faxed documents along with parts of the testimony rendered by an officer of Bajaplay
were sufficient to deem the contract as existing. The Circuit Court then
ordered the Second Chamber to issue a new decision.
Finally, on April 29, 2008,28 the Second Chamber issued a second and
final decision consistent with that of the Circuit Court. In that decision,
the Second Chamber starts by acknowledging that the dispute is governed
by the CISG because seller and buyer have their domiciles in contracting
states. Clearly, the Second Chamber’s use of the word domicile was wrong,
since the CISG intentionally left out this word and instead opted for the
more neutral phrase “place of business.”
27. Professor Alejandro Garro shed some light on the fact that in some legal
systems the parties’ failure to cite the CISG could be interpreted as a tacit exclusion under CISG Article 6. The common law system does not follow the “jura novit
curia” principle and a decision from the Oregon Court of Appeals found that it was
extemporaneous for parties to cite the CISG if they did not do so at the trial level.
The case is GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, 914 P.2d 682
(Or. 1995).
28. This is an unpublished decision of the Judgment of the Second Chamber
of the Baja California Superior Court, dated April 29, 2008.
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The Second Chamber then went on to explain that seller had appeared to demand specific performance under CISG Article 61(b). With
regards to the existence of the contract, it cited CISG Article 11’s stipulation that the contract need not be evidenced by writing, and that notwithstanding, seller had submitted twenty invoices that proved its existence.
The Chamber also reasoned that seller had performed its obligations per
CISG Articles 30 and 31, as evidenced by the shipping documents when it
delivered the goods to the trucking company for shipping. The Second
Chamber also ruled that per CISG Article 59, payment was not conditioned on a formal request or compliance with any other formality. Were
it not for the fact that the Second Chamber was forced to issue the decision, I would have to acknowledge that it was not that the ruling was not
bad in terms of its structure and reasoning. Of course, there were no citations to foreign case law to promote uniform interpretation, but then
again, is a court always to do so when the language of a CISG provision is
clear, or should a judge only do so in what Dworkin would call hard cases?29
C.

Banks Hardwoods Inc. v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez30

This case was brought by an American plaintiff, Banks Hardwoods,
Inc. (BHI), against a Mexican buyer, Jorge Angel Kyriakidez (JAK), who
made a verbal agreement to buy various shipments of timber. It went generally undisputed that the parties had established the practice of entering
into verbal agreements for the sale of timber, and that for each order
made to BHI, JAK would issue a postdated check as a form security. BHI
would make the wood available at its place of business in San Diego, California, where JAK would appear to pick up the timber for its import to
Tijuana, Mexico. BHI claimed it was owed a total of U.S. $9,287.00 worth
of goods. JAK raised a defense that is typically raised in such agreements:
that they had not agreed on the date of payment and, thus, JAK’s obligation would not become due until BHI served JAK with a formal demand
for payment, as provided for under Article 2080 of the Federal Civil
Code.31 That argument—as made by buyer—would make the complaint
filed by seller flounder.
29. See generally H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretive Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 269 (2011).
30. See Banks Hardwoods v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez Garcı́a, Juzgado Sexto de
lo Civil de la Ciudad de Tijuana [Sixth Civil Court of the City of Tijuana], Aug.
2005. I would like to thank Romelio Hernández for sharing copies of his
decisions.
31. Código Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], 30 de Agosto de 1931. The Federal Civil Code’s Article 2080
reads:
If the time to make payment has not been fixed and if such obligation is
one to deliver, the creditor may not demand payment until after thirty
days following a formal request, either with the assistance of the court, or,
with the assistance of a notary or two witnesses. Regarding obligations to
perform, it must be complied with when so demanded by the creditor,
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The trial court found for BHI. In reaching its decision, however, the
judge considered that the documents submitted were of the kind contemplated under Articles 371, 372, and 373 of the Commerce Code, when in
fact none of these provisions were applicable because they were displaced
by the CISG. With regard to the defense raised by buyer—that no formal
demand had been previously made—the judge dismissed buyer’s argument citing CISG Article 58, ruled that payment became due when the
goods were placed at buyer’s disposal in San Diego, California, and ordered JAK to pay the outstanding amount plus interest. In doing so, the
trial court did not discuss CISG Articles 61 and 62 (nor any other statute)
to justify BHI’s right to require that JAK pay the price, making the decision incomplete and legally defective, because the relief granted was not
reasoned in law. The same can be said about the court’s order that JAK
pay BHI interest at a rate of 6% per annum, because seller was unable to
prove that they had agreed to a 2% monthly interest as claimed. Clearly,
in spite of the fact that this could be a favorable decision from seller’s
perspective, the methodology that was followed leaves much to be desired.
The Superior Court of Baja California continued this odd “mix ‘n match”
practice of internal and international rules, even though the Commerce
Code is clearly inapplicable in cases involving international sales.
On appeal, JAK argued that the trial level judge had failed to consider
its argument that no formal demand had been made by BHI, and that
therefore BHI’s complaint should not have succeeded.32 The Superior
Court dismissed this argument, and affirmed the judgment issued by the
trial court, but committed the same mistake of citing provisions from the
Commerce Code. Regarding the issue of the prerequisite formal demand
required under the Civil Code, the Superior Court found that this formality was not applicable, as this matter was governed by Articles 58 and 59 of
the CISG, which provide that payment was not subject to the compliance
of any type of formality.33 The Superior Court then went on to discuss the
importance of promoting the observance of good faith in international
trade, as provided for under Article 7 of the Convention, and even included a passage from the CISG’s preamble,34 when it stated that:
provided sufficient time has transpired for the performance of the
obligation.
Id.
32. See Banks Hardwoods v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez Garcı́a, Segunda Sala del
Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Baja California [Second Panel of the Superior
Court of Justice of Baja California], Mar. 2006.
33. CISG, supra note 1, art. 59 (“The buyer must pay the price on the date
fixed by or determinable from the contract and this Convention without the need
for any request or compliance with any formality on the part of the seller.”).
34. Although the Preamble was added in the latter part of the discussions, it
consequently has a very relative value. See John Honnold, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 598 (2d ed. 1991) (“UNCITRAL did not prepare a preamble nor
was this matter considered by the committees of the Vienna Conference that considered its Convention’s substantive provisions . . . . [A] preamble was first consid-
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The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, entered into on the eleventh day of April of
nineteen eighty, has as its primary objective the creation of common provisions to govern said legal act, based on the premise
that international trade must be based on principles of equality
and mutual benefit, which constitutes an important element to
Foster friendly relations amongst member States, and therefore,
taking into account the New International Economic Order, as
the Contracting States, by way of this Convention, adopted uniform rules, applicable to the international sale of goods, taking
into account different social, economic and legal backgrounds,
to contribute to the removal of legal obstacles in international
trade.
In spite of its attempt to improve on the judgment issued by the trial
court, the Superior Court’s decision was just as flawed. It reiterated the
practice of issuing judgments citing provisions from the CISG and the
Commerce Code that the CISG displaces, even though the Superior Court
acknowledged that the domestic statute was displaced. In another part of
its decision, the Superior Court said that the CISG includes its own rules
of interpretation, requiring that it be applied uniformly and in a manner
that assures the observance of good faith in international trade. Clearly,
in spite of the fact that the Superior Court referred to all of the interpretative criteria, the reality is that it failed to observe at least two criteria: the
mandates to apply both an international and uniform interpretation of
the CISG, which can only be achieved when judges (or arbitrators) take
into account international case law in applying it.
D.
1.

Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V.

Background

In this case, Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. (Rengo) a Chilean seller, filed an
action against Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V. (Azteca), a Mexican buyer of
eighty containers of canned peaches. After receiving the first twenty-two
containers—and refusing to pay for them—Azteca cancelled the contract
for the remainder. The contract was evidenced by a purchase order that
was sent in December of 2002, in which buyer requested eighty containers
that would each carry nine hundred boxes of canned peaches at a price of
$15.65 per box, payable thirty days after each shipment’s date of arrival.
The parties agreed that seller would first send eleven containers per
month starting in February and ending in July of 2003, and a final shipment of fourteen containers in August 2003, for a total price of
$1,126,800.00.
ered and prepared by the Drafting Committee on April 9, two days before
adjournment of the Conference . . . .”).
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The first shipment of eleven containers arrived on February 28, 2003,
while a second shipment arrived a mere two weeks later, on April 17.
Claiming late delivery of the second shipment, on May 5, 2003, Azteca
advised Rengo that it was cancelling the contract for the remaining fiftyeight containers, and additionally refused to pay for the twenty-two containers it had previously received. Rengo filed a complaint with the
Twelfth Civil Court in Mexico City35 demanding payment for the twentytwo containers and interest, as well as damages for the loss of profits from
the balance of the cancelled shipment. In its response, Azteca raised as a
defense that the parties had not agreed on a place and time for payment,
per Articles 2080 and 2082 of the Federal Civil Code. Buyer also counterclaimed for specific performance for the fifty-eight containers due under
the contract, as well as damages it claimed to have suffered as a result of
the late delivery of the other two shipments.
In its decision, the court ordered Azteca to pay seller $309,870.00 U.S.
for the twenty-two containers it had received plus interest, but denied
Rengo’s claim for loss of profit damages. The court reasoned that buyer’s
acceptance of the two late deliveries, per Articles 374, 375, and 376 of the
Commerce Code, had made the sale final,36 particularly because there was
no dispute with regard to the quality of the goods. In spite of the apparent correctness of the result, it is clear that the trial court made a mistake
by not applying the CISG to the case. This issue required an analysis of
CISG Article 33 regarding the time of delivery37 to first determine if the
contract provided that the goods were to be delivered on a fixed date or
within a period of time, and then decide whether seller had breached.
The next step in the analysis required that the judge assess whether the
alleged delay in delivering the second shipment amounted to a fundamental breach per CISG Article 25 (which would have allowed buyer to avoid
the contract),38 or if the delay would merely allow buyer to claim damages.
Once this occurred, the judge should have ordered Azteca to pay per
CISG Articles 61 and 62. Unfortunately, the judge seemed comfortable
with applying a law that had already been displaced by the CISG some
fifteen years earlier.
With regard to the loss of profit damages claimed by Rengo, the judge
considered these to be tantamount to interest and that an order to pay
interest had already been made when it ordered Azteca to pay for the two
shipments. Clearly, CISG Article 74 authorizes loss of profit damages,39
35. Quejoso [Complaint], Juzgado Décimo Segundo Civil del Distrito Federal
[Tenth Civil Court of the Second Federal District], Expediente 30/2004.
36. See Código de Comercio [CCo] [Commercial Code], art. 375, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 27 de Agosto de 2009 (Mex.) (“Si se ha pactado la
entrega de las mercancı́as en cantidad y plazos determinados, el comprador no
estará obligado a recibirlos fuera de ellos; pero si aceptare entregas parciales,
quedará consumada la venta en lo que a éstas se refiere.”).
37. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 33.
38. See id. art. 25.
39. See id. art. 74.
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while CISG Article 78 provides that interest does not prejudice the right to
any other damages a party may have.40 However, the judge seems to have
ignored the applicability of the CISG to this issue and made what was
clearly a bad decision. The judge further reasoned that Rengo was barred
from obtaining damages because no evidence had been submitted to show
that these had actually been suffered.
In addressing buyer’s defenses (that the time and place for payment
had not been fixed in the contract), the judge found this to be a matter
governed by the CISG, and that absent an agreement, and per CISG Article 57, seller’s place of business is the place to effect payment,41 while the
obligation to pay arises once the seller delivers the goods to the buyer or
delivers the documents as provided for under the contract and the
CISG.42 Unfortunately, the judge did not explain why he decided that
some issues should be disposed of based on the Commerce Code (i.e.,
time of delivery or finality of the sale), while other issues (i.e., right to
receive payment even if no place or time have been fixed) were to be
decided based on the CISG. The only answer is that the judge was unfamiliar with the scope of the CISG, and opted to travel down a road he was
more familiar with, clearly violating not just the CISG, but also a constitutional mandate that judges are obligated to render their decisions based
on the applicable law or its legal interpretation. Here, that clearly did not
happen.
2.

The Appeal

Both Rengo and Azteca appealed the trial court’s decision to Mexico
City’s Superior Court.43 In Rengo’s appeal, it claimed that the trial court
wrongfully applied the Federal Civil Code’s Articles 1949, 2104, 2108,
2109, and 2110, and that the trial court did not provide a reasoned decision as to why seller was being denied loss of profit damages. Clearly,
Rengo committed a major error in citing these provisions as the applicable
law to the merits of the dispute, when these issues (i.e., rights of seller
against a breaching buyer and the entitlement to damages) all fall within
the CISG. Buyer made a similar error when it appealed arguing (based on
the Civil Code) that the trial court had erred in ordering Azteca to pay
seller, when neither the date nor the place of payment had been fixed in
the contract, that prior to instituting its complaint, Rengo should have
made a formal demand for payment, and that the matter was not yet ripe
for a lawsuit.
In its decision, the Superior Court made a grandiose statement that it
would apply the CISG—an announcement that causes nothing but disap40. See id. art. 78.
41. See id. art. 57.
42. See id. art. 58.
43. See Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V. The appeals
were lodged under file numbers 767/04/09 and 767/04/10, and were decided by
the Superior Court of the Federal District (Mexico City) on March 16, 2005.
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pointment after reading it. Most of the issues raised on appeal were disposed of with the Superior Court relying on the Federal Civil Code—a
body of law that was (for this case at least) irrelevant. Regarding Rengo’s
claim to loss of profit damages, the Superior Court affirmed the trial
court’s decision, restating that, when the trial court ordered Azteca to pay
interest on the amounts due for the twenty-two containers, seller’s request
had been satisfied by the trial court. Clearly, the Superior Court repeated
the same mistake of confusing such distinct items as damages and interests, and obviously failed to even look at the CISG, though it is not surprising, considering that not even the seller was claiming that it was the
applicable law.
In its wrong-headed analysis, the Superior Court also reasoned that
Rengo needed to prove there was a direct nexus between the breach and
the damages it claimed to have suffered, and that Rengo had failed to
show a deprivation of a profit as a direct result of the breach. The court
further argued that Rengo did not even provide evidence showing that it
had purchased additional machinery to perform its obligations under the
contract, nor that it had manufactured the goods. The court’s reasoning
is not only wrong, it is also blatantly absurd. Parties enter into sales contracts to make a profit. If breached, this will typically cause a loss to the
non-breaching party. CISG Article 74 clearly authorizes a party to demand
damages,44 including loss of profits, which, in the case of a seller, could be
calculated by taking into account the seller’s sales price minus its expenses
in producing the goods. With regard to the issue that seller did not prove
it had produced the goods pending delivery under the contract, it is evident that the Superior Court, showing absolute ignorance, failed to take
into account that under CISG Article 77,45 a non-breaching party is required to take measures to mitigate its losses (including loss of profit), at
the risk of having the other party claim a reduction. Because buyer had
cancelled the contract, it is very likely that Rengo refrained from producing the canned fruit. Clearly, it was not under a duty to produce the
goods, and had it acted otherwise, this would have increased damages.
Another mistake that is evident from the Superior Court’s reasoning
is its interpretation of what the limit for damages should be. It stated that
a party may be entitled to damages that are an immediate and direct result of
the breach—a rule that is provided for under the Civil Code that was superseded in cases governed by the CISG. It is not surprising, given the
inconsistent application of the CISG, that the Superior Court would not
understand that this matter was not governed by the Civil Code. The mistake is not trivial. The limits set forth under the Mexican Civil Code’s
Article 2110 and Article 74 of the CISG are different. While under the
Civil Code damages are subject to an immediacy and directness requirement (which severely limits the amounts that a party may be entitled to
44. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
45. See id. art. 77.
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receive), the CISG takes a more liberal approach. By allowing a party to
claim damages that the breaching party knew would be a possible consequence of his or her breach of contract, the CISG includes a foreseeability
requirement that considers what the contracting party knew at the time it
was making the contract.
The Superior Court committed another error by violating the three
CISG interpretative commandments provided for under Article 7. First, it
relied on case law interpreting the Federal Civil Code’s Article 1949 in
order to deny Rengo its claim to loss of profit damages, in a clear violation
of the CISG’s mandate to take into account its international character. It
also failed to promote uniformity, because not a single case or treatise on
the CISG was cited, which could have assisted the Superior Court in making a correct decision. Finally, it allowed Azteca to walk away without
properly compensating Rengo after it had wrongfully terminated the contract (depriving Rengo of its profits), which clearly does not do much in
terms of promoting the observance of good faith in international trade.
With regard to Azteca’s counterclaim for specific performance for the
remainder of the fifty-eight containers, the Superior Court ruled against
Azteca because it had not performed its part of the bargain, and in reaching this decision, it also mistakenly relied on Article 1949 of the Federal
Civil Code.46 Even if there is an apparent soundness in the result, the
reasoning is evidently flawed because this provision did not even apply. A
correct methodology would have included a discussion of CISG Article
81,47 which relieved Rengo from any pending performance that was due
under the contract because of Azteca’s notice that it was cancelling it.48
This decision once again shows a complete misunderstanding of the CISG
and how it displaces the Commerce and Civil Codes. Of the few salvageable fragments from the decision on appeal is the confirmation that Article 57 of the CISG provides a gap filling rule for those cases where the
parties do not agree on the place of payment.

46. See Código Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], art. 1949, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 30 de Agosto de 1931. This provision reads:
Article 1949—The right to avoid contractual obligations is implicit in reciprocal agreements, in the event that one of the parties fails to perform
what it is obliged to.
The non-breaching party may choose between demanding specific performance or avoidance, and will be entitled to damages in any case. A
party may also request avoidance even after it has chosen specific performance, when it is impossible to perform.
Id. It is worth noting that even the application of this provision was wrong from a
domestic perspective. The applicable provision should have been Article 376 of
the Commerce Code.
47. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(1).
48. See id. art. 72.
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Federal Court Review of the Superior Court’s Decision

As a consequence of the decision rendered by the Superior Court,
both Rengo and Azteca appealed before the Fifth Panel of the First Circuit.49 In a nutshell, seller’s issue was that its fundamental rights had been
violated when the courts refused to grant Rengo’s claim for damages, because it was being deprived of earnings it was rightfully entitled to receive
from the cancelled contract. According to Rengo, neither the judge at the
trial level nor the magistrates on appeal took into account that there was
evidence on record showing Azteca’s breach for failure to pay, as well as
the cancellation of the contract, and that therefore, the courts should
have ordered buyer to pay damages. The Panel from the Circuit Court did
not agree.
In its decision, the Circuit Court made an interpretation of Articles
1949, 2108, 2109, and 2110 of the Federal Civil Code and refused to find
for Rengo, claiming that no evidence had been submitted to allow the
calculation to be made. As with the trial and Superior Court, this decision
was wrong because it continued to apply the Federal Civil Code when it
was not even applicable,50 as if it in some way superseded the CISG. The
Circuit Court was also wrong in setting such a high standard for the proof
of damages. According to an opinion of the CISG Advisory Council, it
would suffice to show the facts in a reasonable manner, not with mathematic precision;51 otherwise, one of the purposes of the CISG—uniform
application—would be undermined,52 because some countries may have
varying standards to prove damages. Such varying standards would in turn
49. See Agrofrut Rengo, S.A., amparo No. 292/2005, and Levadura Azteca,
S.A. de C.V., amparo No. 293/2005, both before el Quinto Tribunal Colegiado en
Materia Civil del Primer Circuito.
50. Seller’s rights can be enforced under the CISG per Article 61, which includes a catalogue of available remedies that a seller can use to enforce its rights
against the buyer, such as the right to demand performance of the payment obligation. Articles 74 and 76 include rules that permit the parties to calculate their
damages. CISG Article 78 explains the cumulative nature of damages and interest.
51. See CISG Advisory Council, Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under
CISG Article 74, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html.
52. See id. The CISG opinion provides the following:
2.3 The existence of differing rules concerning the proof of damage
could lead to the differential treatment of similarly situated parties. For
example, buyers attempting to prove future losses often rely on assumptions about market prices and the amount of future sales. If a seller
wrongfully refuses to deliver a new product or a product that the buyer
had not previously been in the business of selling, there may be little
concrete evidence on which the aggrieved buyer can base its damages
claim, which would mainly consist of loss of profit. In such a case, countries requiring a high level of proof with regard to the fact that the aggrieved party suffered a loss would likely not allow the recovery of lost
profits under Article 74. However, in countries that have a more relaxed
level of proof, the aggrieved party may be able to recover such damages
under Article 74. This result would be unfair and undermine the goal of
the CISG to provide a uniform law on the sale of goods. In addition, the
former approach would be contrary to the principle of full compensa-
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invite breach of contracts, undermining the principle of full compensation on which the CISG is based. In this case, that is exactly what has
happened. All the courts involved in this matter set the standard unreasonably high, and ruled in accordance with the local “immediate and direct
consequence” standard, not the “possible consequence” standard provided
for under Article 74 of the CISG.
The Circuit Court, parroting the trial and the Superior Court, opined
that seller was not entitled to receive loss of profit damages, because seller
had not shown that it had made the pending delivery of goods under the
contract.53 However, buyer’s notice that it would no longer receive
seller’s goods was wrongful avoidance, which freed seller from any pending obligation under the contract and also left its rights to claim damages
intact.54 Furthermore, had seller manufactured the goods (as the court
implied was a prerequisite), this would have constituted a violation of the
duty to mitigate provided for under CISG Article 77, which I have already
addressed.
With regard to the claims asserted by Azteca stemming from what it
considered to be a flawed application of Article 375 of the Commerce
Code,55 Rengo was entitled to obtain payment because it was under an
obligation to show that it had complied with all of its obligations under
the contract—namely, the production of the remaining fifty-eight containers of canned peaches. Buyer also insisted that its fundamental rights were
being violated becuase Rengo had not served Azteca with a formal demand for payment, and that therefore the case was not ripe and should
have been dismissed. The Circuit Court dismissed buyer’s claim—but for
the wrong reasons—and simply parroted the argument from the trial and
appellate courts regarding the time of payment, but did not mention Article 59 of the CISG, which was also relevant.56
III. THE MISAPPLICATION

OF THE

CISG

IN

MEXICO

After this sampling of Mexican cases, one should wonder whether this
uniform sales law endeavor makes any sense, at least from the Mexican
perspective. All of the cases that I have found have been particularly bad
examples of CISG application. There was an abundant use (and abuse) of
tion. It also could provide an incentive for a party to breach its contractual obligations.
Id.
53. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 72.
54. See id. art. 81.
55. This Article provides that if delivery has been agreed to, in certain
amounts and at a certain time, the buyer is not obligated to receive the goods if
they are late, but if the buyer accepts partial delivery, the sale shall be deemed final
with regard to these goods.
56. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 59 (“El comprador deberá pagar el precio en
la fecha fijada o que pueda determinarse con arreglo al contrato y a la presente
Convención, sin necesidad de requerimiento ni de ninguna otra formalidad por
parte del vendedor.”).
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expressions typical of Mexican contract law, as well as excessive court reliance on the Mexican Commercial and Civil Codes and case law interpreting them, even when issues were clearly governed by the CISG. Even in
those cases where judges made a grandiose announcement that they
would apply the CISG, it would all end in a hollow promise—judges continued to reason their cases based on domestic statutes.
From this sample, it was also clear that the lawyers involved in these
disputes were not citing the CISG properly, nor were they attempting to
persuade judges with foreign case law interpreting the CISG or treatises
discussing it. I believe that part of the problem may be cultural. As I have
mentioned on other occasions, the responsibility for this abandonment of
the CISG cannot be placed on the shoulders of judges alone; some of it
must be shared by the Mexican bar and law schools. Law schools must
teach the CISG and make it part of their mandatory curricula, and it must
also be included by the publishers of commercial statutes in Mexico. Save
for one publisher, none of them include the CISG as part of their commercial law compilations.
The same problem the CISG faces has also affected other uniform
laws that we have adopted. Take for example UNCITRAL’s Model Law of
Arbitration adopted in Mexico’s Commerce Code in 1993. In 2006, the
Mexican Supreme Court addressed the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in a
manner that caused more than a few eyebrows to rise.57 In a divided decision, the majority held that courts had jurisdiction to address the validity
of arbitration clauses, and not arbitrators. The minority cited ample authority, including the Model Law, as well as various rules from major arbitration institutions showing how this was a uniform standard.
Unfortunately, the majority was not swayed, and issued a judgment that is
contrary to the international consensus that arbitrators have jurisdiction to
rule on their own jurisdiction.
In another example, Mexico adopted various rules on electronic commerce (clearly inspired by UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce), which were dispersedly included in various statutes such as the
Federal and Civil and Commercial Codes and the Federal Code of Civil
Procedures. To this date, courts still struggle with the proper weight to be
given to electronic communications.
In spite of my somewhat bleak assessment, I still believe there is hope.
Recent changes to Mexico’s Constitution have incorporated by reference
those rights afforded under human rights treaties that Mexico has ratified,
which has caused an interesting effect: Mexican lawyers and judges are
now becoming aware of the need to take into account these international
instruments and now look at decisions from human rights courts. The
57. See Competencia para conocer de la acción de nulidad del acuerdo de
arbitraje prevista en el primer párrafo del art. 1424 del código de comercio,
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court of Justice of the
Nation], Novena Época, tomo XXIV, Sept. 2006, Materia: Civil, Tesis: 1a./J. 25/
2006, Pagina 5 (Mex.).
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question is how to replicate this effect in the international commercial law
field.
I close with two suggestions. First, I propose that UNCITRAL prepare
a practical handbook for judges to interpret the CISG and other uniform
laws. This could be done in collaboration with other organizations such as
UNIDROIT or the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which
has published numerous handbooks on the international treaties it has
promoted. Second, I propose that UNCITRAL promote training on the
use and interpretation of its international treaties and uniform laws to
reach the goal of promoting the uniform interpretation of international
trade law.
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